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Previous research suggests that the debate on gun control legislation is heavily driven by gun ownership
(e.g., Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001; Wolpert & Gimpel 1998), a rare exception to the literature on selfinterest and policy attitudes in general. However, gun owners are more likely to live in rural rather than
urban areas, and simultaneously have less exposure to violent, gun-related crime. I argue that gun-owners
tend to oppose gun control legislation because they live in a world in which guns are common but crime
is rare. In contrast, many non-gun-owners live in cities, in which crime and gun-related crime is much more
common (see Bolcher 2013). Thus, gun-owners may oppose gun control legislation not just for their own
"selfish" purposes, but also because their environmental context suggests that more guns equates to less
crime. In order to assess this claim, I link survey data from two 2013 Pew People & the Press surveys with
county-level data from the Center for Disease Control on firearm-related homicides. This analysis permits
an empirical test of the degree to which citizens oppose gun control legislation as a function of selfinterest vis-à-vis sociotropic (i.e., communal) interest.
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Introduction
“In gun debate, it’s urban vs. rural,” a USA Today article from February of 2013
proclaimed (Raasch 2013). Similarly, a May 2013 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal suggested
that “while the Democratic/Republican split on guns is often the frame in the gun-control debate,
the bigger divide may be between America’s rural and urban communities” (Chinni, 2013).
Those who follow the gun debate closely would not be surprised by such proclamations; after all,
those who live in cities and those who living in rural areas in many ways experience two
different Americas.
One such difference is that rural residents are much more likely to own a gun or live in a
gun-owning household than urban residents. Pew reported in 2013 that 59% of rural residents
lived in a gun-owning household, compared to only 28% of urban residents (see also Adams
1996 and Blocher 2013 for similar statistics). Surveys also show that urban residents are
significantly more likely to believe that gun owners are “uneducated rural people” and “less
concerned with reducing violence in America” (Kleck et al., 2009), and these negative
stereotypes are inversely related to gun ownership.
At the same time, rural residents are much less likely to experience crime either
personally or vicariously through the community. Between 1966 and 1997, violent crime rates
reported to the police were 5 to 10 times higher and property crime rates 4 to 5 times higher in
the largest cities compared to rural counties gaps. Survey data on victimization reveals similar
gaps between rural and urban areas (Weisheit & Donnermeyer 2000). In 2012, the violent crime
rate was over 400 per 100,000 in metropolitan areas, compared to 117 per 100,000 in non-metro
counties (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013).
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Thus, the interpretation of public opinion on gun laws as driven by urbanicity is
unfortunately confounded with two theoretically important determinants of crime policy
attitudes. I argue that it is not living in a rural area per se, but rather the experience of living in
low-crime areas – which tend to be rural and have high rates of gun ownership – that leads to a
difference in opinion from those in high crime (i.e., urban) areas. In particular, those who live in
low-crime areas should be more likely to believe that more guns leads to less crime, and thus
oppose stricter gun control policies. Conversely, those who live in high crime areas should be
more likely to believe that more guns leads to more crime, and thus be more likely to support
gun control.
In the next section I outline what is known about public opinion toward gun control. Next
I review some recent research examining environmental context, not only in the context of crime
but also with respect to policy attitudes generally. This literature suggests that the local context
matters and is domain specific. After describing the data used in the analyses, I present results
that indicate local crime rates predict some policy attitudes and perceptions regarding the effect
of stricter gun laws, but not all. The paper concludes by identifying some limitations of the
present analyses and their implications for the robustness of this relationship.
Who Supports Gun Control?
As with many policy attitudes, early research focused on demographic differences in
support for gun control. Many of these divisions are similar to those found with respect to public
opinion on crime and justice issues more generally: for instance, females tend to be more
supportive of gun control than males, while Whites tend to be less supportive than Blacks (Kleck
1996). Political attitudes were also investigated, though surveys conducted in the 1980s and even
early 1990s did not uncover a particularly strong relationship between political orientations and
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gun control attitudes (e.g., Kleck 1997; Wolpert & Gimpel 1998). Interestingly, as with attitudes
on abortion (Abramowitz & Saunders 1998), it appears that divisions regarding guns and gun
control were not initially a left/right issue.
However, as the conversation regarding guns and crime in general became louder during
the 1990s, those supporting gun control seem to have aligned with the Democratic Party and
those opposing with the Republican Party (e.g., Baldassarri & Gelman 2008). As a result, more
recent surveys have shown a strong link between Republicanism and/or conservatism and
opposition to gun control measures (e.g., Dowler 2002; Kleck 1996). Thus, surveys of attitudes
on gun control now tend fall in line with more general orientations toward the role of
government, including ideology, partisanship, and individualism (Celinska 2007).
Gun control attitudes also tend to be impacted by external factors such as the media and
elite framing of the issue. This is because, for many citizens, gun control is not a particularly
salient issue and, as such, opinions can be volatile (Kleck 1997). For example, the framing of
gun control policies can alter levels of support by several percentage points (Callaghan &
Schnell 2005), even in the wake of national tragedies such as Columbine (Haider-Markel &
Joslyn 2001). Similarly, Dowler (2002) demonstrated that media exposure to “crime shows” is
correlated with public opinion with respect to general attitudes about gun control (i.e., gun laws
should be less strict) as well as the belief that armed citizens are the best defense against
criminals.1
For others, in particular gun owners, gun control is not only a salient issue but also one
that generates strong opinions. The substantial role played by self-interest makes gun control

1

Media exposure was unrelated to attitudes toward concealed carry permits, however. It should also be noted that
Dowler’s (2002) study was cross-sectional, and thus cannot rule out the possibility of self-selection. Indeed, other
studies have shown that citizens seek out attitudinally consistent information on gun control (Knobloch-Westerwick
& Meng 2009).
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somewhat unusual compared to public opinion in other policy domains, with citizens who own
guns or who live in a gun-owning household much less supportive of gun control measures
compared to those who don’t own or live with guns (Celinska 2007; Kleck 1996; Kleck 1997;
Wolpert & Gimpel 1998).
Beyond these factors, most research has focused on cultural explanations for public
opinion on gun control. Although taking slightly different approaches, these scholars generally
argue that attitudes on gun control are largely symbolic in nature. The major proponents of this
view have all used data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to argue that support for gun
control is based on cultural stereotypes and meanings associated with guns and gun ownership
(Kahan & Braman 2003; Kleck 1997). Indeed, many supporters of gun control measures do not
believe such laws would reduce crime (Kleck 1997; Pew 2013), and respondents in states with
stricter gun laws are no more or less likely to oppose gun control than those in less regulated
states (Wolpert & Gimpel 1998).
For example, Kahan and Braman (2003) have argued that individuals’ positions on gun
control derive from cultural worldviews. In particular, for some, guns have become infused with
themes of honor, courage, chivalry, individual self-sufficiency, and manhood. Others,
meanwhile, believe that guns signify patriarchy, racism, and state control. Their analysis of the
GSS from 1988 to 2000 revealed that hierarchical respondents were nearly twice as likely to
oppose gun control as egalitarians, and individualistic respondents were more than four times as
likely to oppose gun control as those who were more solidaristic in their orientations.
Unfortauntely, their data prohibited them from controlling for gun ownership, a potentially
serious omitted variable given its strong relationship to cultural orientations (Celinska 2007) and
gun policy attitudes.

4

However, Kleck (1996) has similarly argued that gun laws are less about controlling
crime than a statement about the kind of society we live in. As a result, those who support gun
laws are those who are in power and want to retain wealth and influence. He finds that social
groupings are much more important than “crime-related variables” in explaining gun control
attitudes, and thus he concludes that support for gun control is a product of cultural conflict
rather than a response to crime.
While a compelling argument, this theory does not explain where these cultural
worldviews come from. Why do respondents hold these individualistic and hierarchical views in
the first place? I would argue that at least some of these views are a product of the environment,
and in particular perceptions regarding local rates of gun ownership and crime rates – and the
causal inference that citizens tend to make between the two. Thus I do not reject the cultural
argument; instead I merely propose that it is partially a function of the environmental context,
and in particular gun-related crime.
The Role of the Local Environment
Given the ostensibly obvious connection between crime rates and policy attitudes, their
absence in the literature is somewhat notable. As it turns out, this is because early studies failed
to uncover much of a relationship between crime rates and crime policy attitudes in general (e.g.,
Tyler & Weber 1982), or found that other factors such as the media are much more important
explanatory variables (Baumgartner et al. 2008; Gross & Aday 2003; Lowry et al. 2003). At a
glance, these unimpressive findings also seem to hold for gun control attitudes. However, most
of these studies examined the relationship between crime and public opinion at a highly
aggregated level of analysis (i.e., nationally), which is unlikely to reveal a relationship.
Indeed, Gallup’s time series regarding perceptions of crime rates have long shown that
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individuals have more accurate perceptions of local crime rates compared to national ones.2 All
through the late 1990s and 2000s, a majority of Americans believed that crime was on the rise
nationally, despite steady and overall dramatic drops during this time period. In contrast, it turns
out that many citizens have fairly accurate perceptions of local crime rates. The most thorough
analysis to data comes from Hipp (2013), who analyzed survey data from the American
Community Survey over a span of 22 years, and linked it with crime rates at the level of the
Census tract, a neighborhood defined as consisting of 1,200 to 3,000 individuals. He found that
violent crime rates strongly predicted perceptions of local crime rates, with a standardized
coefficient of .7 overall.
Moreover, research in other policy domains has demonstrated that disaggregated data on
the local environmental context can strongly inform residents’ perceptions on a variety of issues.
Oliver & Mendelberg (2000), for example, have found that education levels in a respondent’s zip
code are related to individual’s racial attitudes. Moreover, policy attitudes were impacted by data
from the appropriate level of analysis: opinions on affirmative action in university admissions
and other racial policies that have no local geographic correspondence were unaffected by the
environmental context. Meanwhile, education levels of a respondent’s surrounding area impacted
opinions on job programs and integrated housing, programs that could and would be
implemented at the local level.
Branton and Jones (2005) argue, however, that county level measures are better measures
of the environmental context, as individuals frequently travel beyond the geographical bounds of
their neighborhood and/or zip code, as evidenced by both average commute times and the size of
media markets. Indeed, “[i]ndividuals’ exposure to conditions (racial, socioeconomic, or

2

Unnever and Cullen (2010) nonetheless found that perceptions of national crime rates predicted general
punitiveness toward criminals, but not attitudes toward the death penalty.

6

otherwise) outside the boundaries of a neighborhood or a zip code is not only possible, but very
probable. In this sense, the zip code, census tract, or neighborhood levels may understate likely
exposure to environmental conditions compared to the county level” (pg. 361). Moreover, unlike
zip codes or census tracts, counties have substantive political implications. Their analysis shows
that Whites’ policy attitudes are affected not only by education levels, but also the racial
demographics of the county.
These studies suggests that the environmental context matters when the appropriate level
of analysis is used to explore such relationships. Unfortunately, however, the one study
employing local crime rates suffers from potentially serious data limitations. In particular, Kleck
(1996) compared the predictive value of social groupings (i.e., demographics) to “crime related
variables,” including local crime rates. However, he was able to link crime rates with public
opinion data only for those respondents living in larger cities, defined as having a population of
100,000 or more. The consequence is that only 26% of the original sample is included in the
final analysis, with most if not all respondents living in urban areas. Given the substantial
differences between those living in rural versus urban areas, the omission of rural residents may
explain such null findings.
Guns as Protection from Crime, Not Just Victimization
Although these studies support the notion that the environmental context matters, they do
not address why crime rates should affect attitudes, rather than, for example, victimization or fear
of crime. Certainly gun-owning citizens are more likely to believe guns are the best defense
against criminals than non-gun owning citizens (Adams 1996).
Indeed, though the rural-gun connection may have started out as a function of recreation
and sport (Adams 1996; Blocher 2013), the reason why citizens own guns has shifted heavily
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toward protection over the last few decades. In the mid-1990s, Adams (1996) reported that sport
was named by 72% of the gun-owning public as the main reason for owning a gun. Similarly, a
2013 Pew report notes that in 1999, 26% of gun-owners cited protection as their primary reason
for owning a gun, compared to 49% who cited hunting. By 2013, these numbers had flipped,
with 32% saying they owned a gun predominantly for sport, and 48% for protection. A Gallup
poll from the same year found in the majority of gun owners (60%) spontaneously cited personal
safety or protection as a reason they owned a gun, with the next most frequent mentions being
hunting (36%) and general recreation or sport (13%; Swift 2013).
It is not inherent, however, that this protection is strictly on a personal level. Celinska
(2007) notes that fear of crime and previous victimization are largely unrelated to gun policy
attitudes (although see Kahan and Braman 2003; Kleck 1996). As a result, when gun-owners cite
protection as the reason for owning guns, it is better described as protection of the collective
rather than the individual. Adams (1996) similarly suggests that because support for strict gun
laws is greater when confidence in the police is higher both in the aggregate and at the
individual-level, “the data support the self-help and collective security hypothesis” (pg. 123,
italics added). In other words, while citizens may own guns to protect themselves from personal
victimization, they may also own guns from sociotropic reasons.
Interestingly, recent research on the role of racial attitudes in explaining support for gun
control may further support the idea that guns are for both individual and collective protection.
Using ANES data, O’Brien et al. (2013) demonstrated that more racially antagonistic Whites are
not only substantially more likely to own a gun, but also more likely to support permits to carry
concealed handguns. (Racial attitudes do not, however, predict opposition to a handgun ban.)
Given that many Whites have strong associations between race and crime (e.g., Eberhardt et al.,
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2004, Payne 2001), it appears that at least some whites are opposed to gun control for protective
reasons, and specifically protection from violent Blacks. More importantly for the present, this is
a group-based perspective; that is, gun ownership is viewed as both an individual and a collective
protective measure. Thus, to the extent that perceptions of gun-related crime matters for gun
policy attitudes, we should see respondents reacting to community and collective basedmeasures, not just individual ones.
Theory and Hypotheses
In sum, previous research has largely failed to find much a link between crime rates and
policy attitudes. However, little research has examined this relationship using local crime rates, a
theoretically more compelling level of analysis given that many Americans have misperceptions
about national crime rates but fairly accurate perceptions of local ones. Moreover, when local
crime rates have been considered, analyses have been restricted to urban areas, a problematic
data limitation given that rural and urban residents experience very different levels of crime.
However, it is not just that rural and urban residents experience different levels of crime,
but also that they exhibit substantially different rates of gun ownership. Thus, the rural/urban
divided can be described as a difference between those who live in low crime and high gun
ownership areas, and those who experience high levels of crime but low gun ownership rates. I
argue that it is this interactive combination, rather than the more simplistic view of rural vs.
urban espoused by the media, that leads citizens to different perceptions and attitudes about gun
control.
In particular, local crime rates – and specifically local firearm homicide rates – should
affect attitudes toward gun control legislation and perceptions regarding the consequences of
these laws. Citizens in safer counties, which tend to be more rural and gun-owning, should be
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less likely to believe that more guns equals more crime. Instead, they should believe that more
guns equates to less crime. Thus, measures designed to restrict gun ownership should be seen as
making safe communities vulnerable to crime, and this opposed by such individuals. Moreover,
this relationship should remain even when controlling for urbanicity and gun ownership.
I must admit up front that I cannot directly test this theory with the available data. While
the survey data I employ includes several interesting attitudinal variables, it does not ask
respondents whether they think more gun leads to more or less crime. Thus I cannot test whether
the link between crime rates and attitudes toward gun control is mediated by the perceived causal
link between gun ownership and crime rates. Nonetheless, the present analysis takes a first step
in this direction, by assessing whether local crime rates exhibit a relationship to individual
perceptions and attitudes at all.
Data and Methods
The attitudinal data comes from two surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center for
the People and the Press in early 2013. The first was conducted January 9-13 (n = 1502; AAPOR
RR3 was 10.4% for the landline sample and 5.9% for the cell phone sample), and the second
February 13-18 (n = 1504; AAPOR RR3 was 10.3% for the landline sample and 5.9% for the
cell phone sample). Although the data sets are freely available for download online, geographic
information – including respondents’ county FIPS code – must be requested from the Pew
Research Center.
The two surveys provide two sets of questions: one assessing support for a series of
proposed gun laws, and one assessing the perceived effects of these gun laws. With respect to the
latter, respondents in the February survey were asked to tell the interviewer whether they agreed
or disagreed with “some things people say would occur if there were stricter gun laws” on a four-
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point scale. These statements, which were randomly presented to respondents, are:




Stricter laws would make it more difficult for people to protect their homes and families
Stricter laws would help keep guns out of the hands of criminals
Stricter laws would reduce the number of deaths caused by mass shootings3

All variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the perception that gun laws
are not restricting (i.e., do not make it more difficult to protect home and family) and effective
(i.e., keep guns out of the hands of criminals and reduce mass shootings). The January survey
queried respondents on several policy attitudes in a split-ballot design. In particular, half of the
respondents were asked whether they “favor or oppose” each of the following:







A ban on semi-automatic weapons
A ban on the sale of ammunition online
Laws to prevent people with mental illness from purchasing guns
Making private gun sales and sales at gun shows subject to background checks
A ban on assault style weapons
A ban on high-capacity ammunition clips that hold more than 10 bullets4, 5
Respondents were also asked whether they thought it was “more important to control gun

ownership or to protect the rights of gun owners.” Weighted responses to these policy questions,
which can be found in Table 1, were recoded to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating support for
the proposed gun laws.
[Table 1 about Here]
Perhaps what stands out the most about these policy attitudes is the variation in opinion:
Respondents were also asked for their reactions to the statements that “stricter laws would give too much power to
the government over average citizens” and “gun control measures will eventually lead to stricter laws which will
take guns away from all citizens.” Given that these statements speak to the appropriate role of government rather
than the efficacy and protective value of gun control laws, it was not expected that crime rates would matter for
opinions toward these statements. Similarly, respondents were asked whether “stricter gun laws would reduce the
number of accidental deaths caused by guns,” a question that does not concern safety from others.
4
The questions regarding bans on assault style weapons, high-capacity ammunition clips, and making private gun
sales and sales at gun shows subject to background checks were also asked of respondents in the February survey;
however, the results are identical and thus only the data from January are presented.
5
Respondents were also asked for their support for “putting armed security guards or police in more schools,”
“more teachers and school officials having guns in schools,” and “creating a federal government database to track all
gun sales.” It was not expected that crime rates would affect these policy attitudes and as a result they are not
included in the analysis.
3
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some policies exhibit overwhelming support, such as requiring background checks for private or
gun show sales (88%) and passing laws to prevent people with mental illness purchasing guns
(83%). Others receive a solid but smaller majority level of support, such as banning semiautomatic (60%) or assault (57%) weapons. Stricter laws related to ammunition receive a bare
majority of support, with 56% favoring a ban on large ammunition clips and 54% favoring the
sale of ammunition online.
When it comes to general orientations toward gun laws and perceptions about the
consequences of such laws, however, the public is much more evenly divided. Whereas 59% of
respondents think stricter gun laws would make it harder to protect oneself, 49% also think such
laws would help keep guns out of the hand of criminals. Similarly, 47% think it’s more important
to protect the rights of gun owners than to control gun ownership, but 45% also think stricter
laws would reduce deaths from mass shootings.
Survey respondents were also asked a series of standard socio-demographic and political
controls, which are included in the models presented below. Dummy variables were created to
indicate male, Black, and Hispanic respondents, as well as whether the respondents lived in a
rural or urban area (with suburban residents as the reference category). Age, education, and
income were all recoded to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the oldest, most educated, and
wealthiest respondents in the sample. Partisanship and ideology were also recoded to range from
0 to 1, with 1 indicating a Republican or very conservative respondent, and 0 for Democrats and
liberals. Finally, a dummy variable was created to control for gun ownership, either by the
respondent or someone else in the household. Table 2 compares the weighted sample
demographics with data from the American Community Survey for 2013.
[Table 2 about Here]
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The crime data were requested6 from the Center for Disease Control’s National Center
for Health Statistics, which keeps records of all deaths including the place of occurrence (i.e.,
county) and primary cause by year; the latest available mortality data is from 2010. Using the
ICD-10 codes, I computed a count of the number of gun-related homicides (X93, X94 and X95)
in 2010, then divided by the Census Bureau’s county population estimates for 2010 and
multiplied by 100,000 to generate a county-level firearm homicide rate (per 100,000).
Finally, these data sets were then merged using the county FIPS. Merging was successful
with the exception of 29 respondents (2%) in the February sample and 32 respondents (2%) in
the January sample, for whom no information could be found in the CDC’s mortality file.
Although I am awaiting clarification on these counties from the CDC, they are all rural and
sparsely populated counties: the median population among matched counties was nearly 38,000,
while the median population among unmatched counties was less than 16,000, with the largest
home to roughly 64,000 residents in 2010 (and also less than the mean population of matched
counties at over 99,000). As a result, it was assumed that no firearm homicide were recorded for
these counties in 2010 and their firearm homicide rates were recoded to equal 0. Nonetheless, the
results are substantively identical treating these counties as missing data, though there are some
minor reductions in statistical significance due to the smaller sample size.
Results
Table 3 first presents the results of predicting perceived consequences of stricter gun laws
as a function of local gun-related homicide rates and a series of socio-demographic controls
variables. Specifically, Column 1 examines the predictors of disagreeing that stricter gun laws
will make it more difficult to protect home and family. Column 2 examines these predictors with
6

Both Pew and the CDC required data use agreements in order to access the geographic identifiers and county-level
data, respectively. As such, I am unable to share these data directly; however, they can be requested from their
respective organizations for replication.
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respect to respondents’ agreement with the statement that stricter gun laws will reduce deaths
from mass shooting, while Column 3 displays the results for predicting agreement that they will
keep guns away from criminals.
As can be seen in Table 3, firearm homicide rates positively and significantly predict the
perception that stricter gun laws will reduce the number of deaths from mass shootings as well
the belief that they will keep guns away from criminals. Assuming all other variables are held
constant at their means and modes7, a respondent who lives in a county with no firearm
homicides is 6 percentage points less likely to believe that stricter gun laws keep guns away from
criminals compared to a similarly situated respondent in a county with a rate of firearm violence
that is 1 standard deviation above the mean (7.65 gun-related homicides per 100,000 residents).
However, someone who lives in the highest crime rate county (Orleans County, LA, with a gunrelated homicide rate of 48.58 per 100,000 residents) is 39 percentage points more likely to
believe the stricter gun laws will keep guns away from criminals than those in counties free of
gun violence.
Although crime rates are positively skewed (s = 3.58), a quarter of the sample lived in
counties with firearm homicide rates of 28 or above, which increases the probability of agreeing
that strict gun laws keep guns away from criminals by 19 percentage points compared to those in
the safest counties. For comparison, gun owners are nearly 22 points less likely to believe this
than respondents who do not live in gun-owning households. Similarly, the effect of partisanship
is roughly 34 percentage points, with a Democrat having a 57% probability of agreeing with this
statement, compared to a 23% chance for an otherwise identical Republican. Thus, the effect of
local crime rates is as large as those found for gun ownership and partisanship, larger if

7

Thus assuming a White, non-Hispanic female who lives in the suburbs, does not own a gun, is a moderate
Independent, and is of average age, education and income levels.
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considering the maximal effect.
The perception that stricter gun laws will reduce mass shootings is similarly affected by
local crime rates: a respondent who lives in a county with a firearm homicide rate 1 standard
deviation above the mean is 7 percentage points more likely to agree with this statement than a
respondent living in a crime-free neighborhood, which in turn is 21 percentage points less likely
than someone in the highest crime county. Once again, for comparison, the effect of gun
ownership is 16 percentage points, and 29 percentage points for partisanship.
[Table 3 about Here]
Unexpectedly, however, firearm homicide rates are unrelated to the perception that
stricter gun laws would make it more difficult to protect one’s home and family. In general, the
predictors of this perception is somewhat discrepant from the other two presented in Columns 1
and 2. For instance, education and income are positive predictors of the belief that strict gun laws
would not make it more difficult to protect one’s home and family, but non-significant or
negative (in the case of income and keeping guns away from criminals) in the other two
columns. Similarly, Hispanics and non-gun owners are more likely to believe strict gun laws will
reduce homicides and keep guns away from criminals, but are just as likely to think that they will
not make it more difficult to protect home and family than non-Hispanics and gun-owners.
However, this may be because the question taps directly into considerations of personal, rather
than collective safety.
Before moving to attitudes, it is worth noting that the non-significant dummy variables
for urban and rural residence suggest that perceptions regarding the efficacy of gun control laws
are not driven by urbanicity itself. Indeed, once accounting for differences in gun ownership and
crime rates, the rural/urban divide is non-existent. Contrary to the popular media explanation,
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this divide appears instead because of average differences in crime rates across the two. Indeed,
urban respondents lived in counties with significantly more gun violence than rural respondents
(February survey: 𝑥̅ urban = 5.13, 𝑥̅ rural = 2.08, t = 8.63, p < .001; January survey: 𝑥̅ urban = 5.48,
𝑥̅ rural = 2.50, t = 7.08, p < .001).
The results for gun control attitudes is divided into two tables: those policy attitudes that
are significantly predicted by firearm homicide rates (Table 4) and those that are not (Table 5).
In particular, Table 4 reveals that local firearm rates are related to the belief that it is more
important to control gun ownership than protect the rights of gun owners, and supporting a ban
on semi-automatic weapons as well as laws to keep guns away from the mentally ill. While the
statistical significance of these effects is marginal, these relationships are of equal substance
relative to perceptions regarding the effects of strict gun laws.
[Table 4 about Here]
In particular, respondents living in counties with firearm homicide rates 1 standard
deviation above the mean (8.49 per 100,000 residents for the January sample) are nearly 6
percentage points more likely to say that it is more important to control ownership than a
respondent living in a county free of firearm violence. In turn, this is 19 percentage points less
than the probability of someone in the most violent county believing gun ownership to be more
important than gun rights. The relationship between firearm violence and favoring a ban on
semi-automatic weapons and laws to keep the mentally ill away from guns are substantively
quite similar, although the elasticity of this effect changes. In other words, the difference
between respondents living in an average county and living in a county with no recorded firearm
deaths is smaller for these policy attitudes, while the difference between these respondents and
living in the most violent county is larger.
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In contrast to the perceived efficacy of gun laws, partisanship and gun ownership are less
substantively important for policy attitudes. Neither significantly predict attitudes toward the
mentally ill. Gun owners are only 12 percentage points more likely to oppose a ban on semiautomatic weapons than non-gun owners, and Republicans only 8 percentage points more likely
than Democrats. With respect to general gun rights, however, gun ownership and partisanship are
substantial predictors, with gun owners 27 percentage points more likely than non-gun owners
and Republicans 30 percentage points more likely than Democrats to say it more important to
protect the rights of gun owners than to control gun ownership.
It is also worth noting that to the extent that rural and urban residency is related to these
policy attitudes, it is not as one would expect. That is, once controlling for crime rates, urban
residents are actually significantly less likely to support a ban on semi-automatic weapons of
laws to keep the mentally ill away from guns. Rural residents are marginally significantly more
likely to believe that it is more important to protect the rights of gun owners than to control
ownership, but there is no difference with respect to the other two policy attitudes.
[Table 5 about Here]
However, there are just as many policy attitudes that are not predicted by firearm
homicide rates. As Table 5 reveals, local crime rates are unrelated to favoring a ban on the sale
of ammunition online and high capacity ammunition clips, or favoring a requirement for
background checks for private and gun show sales of firearms. Moreover, respondents in more
violent counties were marginally significantly less likely to support a ban on assault weapons.
In general, the ban on assault weapons and high capacity ammunition clips are more
consistently predicted than the other two, with age, education, gun ownership, ideology and
partisanship all consistent and significant predictors of these proposed policies. In contrast, the
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idea of background checks is only informed by income, and a proposed ban on the sale of
ammunition online by partisanship. Thus, at least one reason these latter two policies are
unrelated to crime rates may be because respondents had not considered these policies much at
all. In other words, at least some of the policies in Table 5 may reflect Kleck’s (1996) concern
about public opinion toward many gun control policies, add local firearm homicide rates do not
predict these policy attitudes because non-attitudes are, of course, unpredictable.
Discussion
There are several steps I plan to take going forward in order to test the robustness of this
relationship. In particular, neither Pew study included measures of general cultural orientations, a
predictor of gun control attitudes that has a great deal of support in the literature. The surveys do,
however, include questions regarding spending preferences on social security, “needy people,”
Medicare, and the unemployed. Although these would be messy measures of individualism, both
Kahan & Braman (2003) and Celinska (2007) used similar proxy measures of cultural
orientations. For example, Kahan & Braman (2003) measured hierarchy-egalitarianism with
attitudes toward race, the military, capital punishment and sexual orientation, while
individualism/solidarism was measured by spending on regulatory and social welfare programs.
Celinska (2007) similarly measured individualism with attitudes toward government improving
citizens’ standard of living, doing more, helping to pay for medical care, and so on. Thus,
although these would be imperfect measures of cultural worldviews, they would at least be
relatively comparable to those used in prior research. In the meantime, while cultural worldviews
are correlated with gun policy attitudes, it seems theoretically unlikely that they are related to
local crime rates; as a result, concerns of omitted variable bias should be lessened.
A potentially more important factor absent from these models is the racial composition of
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respondents’ county of residence. Given that some (but not all; see Hipp 2013) previous studies
have found that the racial demographics of a county can impact not only individuals’ perceptions
of crime rates (Quillian & Pager 2001) but also racial policy attitudes (Branton & Jones 2005),
information regarding the racial make-up of respondents’ county of residence should be
measured and controlled for in future iterations of these models.
A related concern is that perceptions of local crime rates differ across levels of actual
crime rates. This may be the case, particularly if more crime leads to a disproportionate amount
of media coverage. It is plausible, for instance, that urban residents have more accurate
perceptions of local crime rates because they tend to live in higher crime areas. One relatively
easy but imperfect way to address this concern is to account for county-level education level as a
proxy for a community’s ability to perceive crime rates accurately; a more technical but not
mutually exclusive approach would be to run heteroskedastic probits that assess whether
respondents’ attitudes are predicted with less error when they live in higher crime areas.
A final concern is the heightened salience of gun control during these two surveys.
Indeed, both surveys were taken within a few months of the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary
on December 14, 2012, when gun violence and gun control was near the top of the political
agenda. In mid-January, President Obama revealed a series of gun control initiatives that, as it
turns out, would not make it very far. Indeed, several of Obama’s proposals are alluded to in the
survey, including background checks for private and gun show sales, banning assault weapons,
limiting clips to no more than 10 rounds, and increasing funding for treatment of mental illness
and other proposals to limit this population’s access to guns. Typically, however, gun control is
an issue that largely remains outside of everyday awareness. Replicating these models with
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survey data taken at another point of time when gun control is at a more typical level of salience
would help to assuage concerns regarding robustness of the results.8

8

In fact, I had originally proposed using the 2012 ANES, which contains a few questions on gun policy and was
conducted prior to the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary. Unfortunately my institution does not have an IRB that
is registered with the Department of Health and Human Services and, as such, I cannot request the geographic
identifiers for respondents. If anyone has helpful suggestions for alternative data sets I would be grateful.
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Table 1: Public Opinion towards Gun Control Laws
January
February
2013
2013
Stricter gun laws would make it more
difficult to protect homes and families
Disagree
-41
Agree
-59
Stricter gun laws would reduce the number
of deaths caused by mass shootings
Disagree
-55
Agree
-45
Stricter gun laws would help keep guns out
of the hands of criminals
Disagree
-51
Agree
-49
Require background checks at gun shows
Favor
Oppose
Ban assault weapons
Favor
Oppose
Ban ammunition clips holding more than
10 bullets
Favor
Oppose
More important to:
Control gun ownership
Protect the rights of gun owners
Pass laws to prevent people with mental
illness purchasing guns
Favor
Oppose
Ban semi-automatic weapons
Favor
Oppose
Ban sale of ammunition online
Favor
Oppose
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88
12

85
15

57
43

57
43

56
44

55
45

53
47

53
47

83
17

---

60
40

---

54
46

% Male
% Black
% Hispanic

Table 2: Sample Demographics
Census Data
January 2013
(ACS 2013)
49
49
13
12
17
14

Median age (s.d.)

February 2013
48
12
14

37

53 (18)

52 (18)

(Up to $35K) 24
($35-75K) 42
35

37
37
27

37
34
29

41
29
30

40
32
28

43
28
28

Ideology
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative

22
38
40

22
40
39

Partisanship
Democrat
Independent
Republican

33
41
26

33
44
22

% Gun in household

35

40

Income
Under $30,000
$30,000-$74,999
$75,0000 or more
Education
H.S. degree or less
Some college
College degree or higher

N=
1502
1504
Note: Entries are percentages, sampling weights applied. Columns may not sum to 100 due to
rounding.
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Table 3: Local Firearm Homicide Rates Predicts Perceptions of Stricter Guns Laws
Agree they will
Agree they will
Disagree they
reduce deaths from
keep guns away
will make it more
mass shootings
from criminals
difficult to
protect home and
family
Male
-.068
.017
-.054
(.090)
(.092)
(.086)
Age
.495**
.341*
.448**
(.194)
(.193)
(.189)
Education
.126
-.170
.955**
(.186)
(.194)
(.179)
Income
.125
-.336*
.326*
(.179)
(.182)
(.179)
Black
.492**
.257
.042
(.178)
(.157)
(.146)
Hispanic
.491**
.463**
.143
(.153)
(.159)
(.137)
Urban Residence
.066
.017
.030
(.108)
(.106)
(.096)
Rural Residence
.182
-.040
.015
(.123)
(.124)
(.129)
Gun Owner
-.442**
-.568**
-.064
(.100)
(.103)
(.095)
Conservative
-.604**
-.304
-.943**
(.220)
(.218)
(.199)
Republican
-.896**
-.910**
-.596**
(.137)
(.139)
(.132)
Firearm Homicide
.027**
.021**
-.000
Rate
(.009)
(.010)
(.011)
(per 100,000)
Cutpoint 1
-.951**
-1.143**
-.322*
(.202)
(.191)
(.182)
Cutpoint 2
-.579**
-.817**
.237
(.200)
(.190)
(.181)
Cutpoint 3
.043
-.358*
.794**
(.197)
(.189)
(.182)
F=
15.92**
16.21**
10.41**
N=
868
878
870
Note: Data is from the Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, February 2013. Entries
are ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Sampling weights applied.
* p < .10 ** p < .05, two-tailed tests.
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Table 4: Local Firearm Homicide Rates Predict Some Gun Policy Attitudes
More important
Ban semiLaws to Keep
to control
automatic
Mentally Ill
ownership
weapons
From Guns
Male
-.327**
-.542**
.083
(.095)
(.132)
(.163)
Age
.366*
1.036**
.542
(.212)
(.303)
(.373)
Education
.041
.096
.077
(.205)
(.288)
(.388)
Income
-.075
.227
1.744**
(.184)
(.250)
(.352)
Black
.222
.073
-.184
(.174)
(.233)
(.274)
Hispanic
.322**
-.160
-.747**
(.156)
(.208)
(.220)
Urban Residence
-.061
-.300*
-.450**
(.110)
(.155)
(.184)
Rural Residence
-.214†
-.200
.276
(.132)
(.179)
(.268)
Gun Owner
-.709**
-.387**
.194
(.099)
(.138)
(.187)
Conservative
-.716**
-.841**
-.131
(.212)
(.275)
(.338)
Republican
-.902**
-.295
-.067
(.012)
(.189)
(.235)
Firearm Homicide Rate
.019†
.020*
.021†
(per 100,000)
(.012)
(.011)
(.013)
Constant
1.162**
1.011**
.785**
(.214)
(.292)
(.377)
F=
16.64**
4.52**
5.07**
N=
1,128
562
565
Note: Data is from the Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, January 2013.
Entries are probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Sampling weights
applied. † p < .11 * p < .10 ** p < .05, two-tailed tests.
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Table 5: Local Firearm Homicide Rates Do Not Predict All Policy Attitudes
Ban Assault
Ban Sale of
Ban High
Require
Weapons
Ammunition
Capacity
Background
Online
Ammunition
Checks for
Clips
Private and Gun
Show Sales
Male
-.241*
-.325**
-.145
-.254
(.132)
(.128)
(.129)
(.167)
Age
.532*
.101
.575**
-.439
(.299)
(.284)
(.281)
(.395)
Education
1.077**
.091
1.088**
.561
(.305)
(.277)
(.302)
(.405)
Income
-.353
.071
-.016
.709**
(.270)
(.240)
(.255)
(.310)
Black
-.232
.041
-.406*
-.401
(.219)
(.225)
(.211)
(.306)
Hispanic
.369
-.327†
-.386*
-.389
(.234)
(.201)
(.229)
(.253)
Urban Residence
.139
.027
-.011
.039
(.153)
(.149)
(.146)
(.191)
Rural Residence
.018
-.041
-.292*
-.047
(.179)
(.175)
(.177)
(.218)
Gun Owner
-.614**
-.147
-.248*
-.262†
(.142)
(.134)
(.140)
(.164)
Conservative
-.848**
-.293
-.806**
-.322
(.328)
(.270)
(.310)
(.344)
Republican
-.441**
-.318*
-.405**
-.289
(.196)
(.186)
(.189)
(.017)
Firearm Homicide Rate
-.032*
.007
.005
.024
(per 100,000)
(.018)
(.011)
(.017)
(.017)
Constant
.871**
.635**
.380
1.440**
(.300)
(.273)
(.274)
(.369)
F=
6.58**
1.75*
5.52**
2.55**
N=
568
563
572
566
Note: Data is from the Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, January 2013. Entries are probit
coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Sampling weights applied. † p < .11 * p < .10 ** p < .05,
two-tailed tests.
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